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Abstract 
The importance of taxation as a major public finance to developed and developing countries is non-debatable. The issue of 
smuggling activities related to the indirect taxation had caused a great lost to the government not only in term of monetary 
aspect, but also non-monetary aspects such as quotas, embargo and product quality. However, the study of a tax evasion 
and smuggling activities in the indirect taxation have received less attention among the researchers and legislators. Hence, 
the current study aims to examine factors affecting the tax evasion on excise duties for importation of vehicles that can be 
associated with smuggling activities in Malaysia. The study has indentified several potential determinants related to tax 
evasion on imported vehicles, such as the tax rate, penalty structure, the car’s brand and size of the business of car 
importers. To achieve the objectives, this study used sample data from vehicles smuggling cases investigated by the tax 
authorities in Malaysia. The hypotheses were tested using both univariate and multivariate statistical methods. The 
statistical results provided evidence on the significant values of evaded excise duties, whereby the excise duties and 
penalty rates are the contributing factors for the tax evasion in vehicles smuggling activities.  Hence, this study contributes 
towards the body of literature in the discussed area and also provides strategic information to the policymakers in 
reviewing the tax policy related to excise duties on imported vehicles in the future. 
 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the ICEBR 2013. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Tax has always been an important and crucial tool for the government administration in most developed 
and developing countries. The economists believe that tax not only generate revenue for the public finance but 
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also as an income re-distribution of the rich to the poor (Saez, 2004). The principle of economic welfare 
applies in the tax system, whereby the government finances its expenditure by imposing charges and levies on 
citizens and corporate entities (Businessdictionary.com, 2012). In Malaysia, the evolution of the taxation 
system had emerged rapidly from indirect taxes (in 1970s) to the direct taxes (in 1990s) in order to achieve 
income re-distribution objective. However, in the recent government transformation programme (GTP), 
Malaysia would reemphasize on indirect tax system, such as good and service tax (GST) that is a broad based 
tax to increase the tax revenue.  
A good tax system should comprise of principles such as efficiency, fairness and equity, as well as 
neutrality principles. However, it is very difficult to achieve all the principles. For example, to achieve the 
principle of fairness and equity, the tax system would a certain extent need to forgo the neutrality principle. 
Hence, as a result the tax non-compliance and evasion occurs, whereby the dishonest person would try to 
avoid or reduce their tax liabilities through illegal means.  
Watrin and Ullmann, 2008, reported that tax evasion is rampant in both direct and indirect taxes. The tax 
gap is normally associated with the tax evasion. The tax gap is the difference between amounts of income that 
should be legally reported and the actual of amount reported to the tax authority. The tax evasion in indirect 
taxes is always associated with smuggling activity or tax evasion on customs tariff. The customs tariff 
includes the import or export of products by unauthorized means and evading the customs duties through 
various ways such as conducting under-invoicing and mis-declaration of goods during import or export. The 
smuggling activities has caused the government losses not only in monetary revenue but also non-monetary 
controlling like quotas, embargo and product quality (Stephen et al., 1991). 
The issues of tax evasion on customs tariff and smuggling activities have received less attention from 
researchers and legislators (Delipalla, 2009). Prior studies only focused on service tax evasion (Rohaya and 
Ezdiani, 2011) and tax planning on corporate income taxation (Md. Noor et al., 2008). Therefore, the current 
study aims to examine the tax gap and factors affecting the tax evasion on excise duties for importation of 
vehicles that can be associated with smuggling activities in Malaysia. The findings of this study will give a 
significant contribution to the relevant authorities about the tax evasion issues in indirect tax system and its 
potential determinants that contribute to the problem.  Furthermore, this study is vital as it will provide 
strategic information to the legislators and most importantly, establish empirical evidence on excise duty 
evasion in Malaysia. 
 
2.  Literature Review  
 
2.1. Malaysian taxation system 
 
The Malaysian taxation system comprised of direct and indirect taxes. The direct taxes are administered 
by the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM), meanwhile the indirect taxes are administered by the 
Royal Malaysian Customs Department (RMCD). The direct taxes include company tax, individual tax, 
cooperative tax which is governed under Income Tax Act 1967; petroleum tax under the Petroleum Tax Act 
1967. The indirect taxes include customs duties, excise duties, sales tax and service tax. Customs duties are 
duties levied on goods being imported or exported and classified into two: import duties and export duties. 
Customs duties are levied under the Customs Duties Order 2012, which is governed by the Customs Act 
1967. The government’s indirect taxation policies will affect the price of the products and services and 
subsequently will also affect consumers purchasing decision (Hussain and Naheed, 2005). However, the free 
trade agreement, trade liberalization and globalization had caused the government to abolish, reduce or 
exempt the tariff rates for many goods and products (Gunasegaram, 2012). This is in line with the requirement 
of the agreement and understanding to eliminate the tariff and no-tariff barrier in international trade.  
 
2.2. Excise duties 
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      Excise duties have been the biggest contributor to the indirect taxes components. For example in 2012, 
excise duties contribute 6 per cent of the total government revenue. The excise duties are levied on selected 
products manufactured locally or imported into Malaysia as prescribed in Section 6 of Excise Act 1976. The 
excise duty is calculated either by specific rates or ad valorem rates from the sales values or quantity of the 
goods or products (Excise Duty Order 2004). The excise duty is a mechanism to modify public consumption 
pattern or social engineering (Delipalla, 2009). The high excise duty imposed by the government of Malaysia 
is to discourage the public from purchasing or consuming unhealthy products or other unhealthy habits like 
cigarettes, tobacco, alcohol, gambling or prostitution. Economists said, excise duties are sin tax, where the 
government imposed taxes on such products or services as a public responsibility (Hoe, 2010). 
 
2.3. Tax evasion 
 
     Tax evasion can be defined as an illegal practice where by any taxable persons intentionally avoid paying 
their true tax liabilities, thus tax evaders are liable for criminal charges (Engel et al., 1999; Manasan, 1988). 
The issue of tax evasion had become a major concern at the national and international level. Issues of non-
compliance became important when it damaged the tax collection system and went against the government’s 
efforts to increase public revenue collection (Franzoni, 1998; Van and Arndt, 2009). The substantial 
difference in prices between two different jurisdictions made smuggling economically profitable (Pitt, 1981).  
The smuggling of goods or products can be considered as one of tax violations that attack a country’s tax 
system (Selimaek, 2005). Smuggling is a punishable offence that is justified in order to deter tax evasion 
practices and to ensure government revenue collections. The main objective of smuggling is to avoid the tariff 
and non-tariff barriers and it involves monetary and non-monetary benefits to the smuggler (Buehn and 
Farzanegan, 2011). There are three types of smuggling activities: 1) Falsely declaring the value, such as lower 
priced and under quantity; 2) Falsely declaring the nature of the goods (mis-classification); and 3) Under-
assessing goods’ value at a level lower than legally applicable (Cooper, 1974). The common customs fraud 
and smuggling schemes are: over and under valuation, over and under shipment, mis-classification on tariff 
code, double invoicing, false invoicing and complex trade approach (Thanasegaran and Shanmugam, 2007). 
In the Malaysian context, indirect taxes can be evaded through a number of ways, such as producing 
fallacious declarations, customs fraud or smuggling. Therefore, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows:   
 
H1: There is a significant difference between declared excise duty and actual excise duty values. 
 
2.4. Determinants of excise duty evasion 
     
     Allingham and Sandmo, 1972, found a positive relationship between tax rates and tax evasion. However, it 
is dependent on particular assumptions of risk aversion and the punishment for evading.  Another study by 
Clotfelter, 1983, disclosed that higher tax rates tend to encourage tax evasion. Fisman and Wei, 2004, 
examined specific tax rates for products in China (tariff plus value-added tax VAT rates), and found that tax 
evasion gap was highly correlated with the tax rates imposed by the country, thus confirming a higher tax loss 
for products with higher tax rates. Ali et al., 2001, and Nur-tegin, 2008, discovered a positive relationship 
between tax rates and tax evasion. Accordingly, Nejad, 2011 reported that the smuggling of goods was 
induced by the tax rates, concluded that higher tax rates would cause a higher tax evasion through smuggling 
activities. Therefore, the second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
                                 
H2a: The excise duty rate is positively related to the excise duty evasion. 
 
       Allingham et al., 1972, explained factors that influenced taxpayers’ behaviour such as risk of audit and 
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penalties for detection of non-compliance. They found that a significant relationship between penalty rate and 
probability of detection which implied that the tax penalties would deter a person from evading taxes. Borck 
and Berlin, 2003, also confirmed that higher penalty rates would reduce the tax evasion. The importation of 
cars into Malaysia is required to pay duties and fulfil the import permit requirements. Therefore, failure to 
comply with these requirements is an offence and will be subjected to penalty. Thus, the current study has 
formulated the following hypothesis: 
 
H2b: The rate of penalty is negatively related to the excise duty evasion. 
 
       The high price of luxury items or branded goods has resulted in higher rates of smuggling into a country 
(Green, 1977). Goel, 2008, said that a substantial price difference across different jurisdictions was also a 
factor for smuggling, especially for luxury items. The prices for imported and luxury cars in Malaysia are 
substantially high compared to the other developing countries (Europol Report 2004, 2005 & 2006; Gerber 
and Killias, 2003). The higher price of imported cars is commonly due to higher tax rates and processing fees. 
A product’s brand name remains very important in the commercial world. This is because nowadays, such 
prestigious brands have become a highly demand products which can be associated with a high level in 
society, self-prestige, quality and a source of self-satisfaction to the customers (Thanasuta et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2c: The brand of a car is positively related to the excise duty evasion. 
 
       The political cost theory stated that the larger size company would have higher tax payments due to 
higher income and have more advantage in terms of internal control and resources (Gupta and Newberry, 
1997). Kenyon, 2008 disclosed that smaller sized firms possessed the highest degree of under-reporting. In 
addition, Hanlon et al., 2005, found that larger firms with more complex operations had more tendencies for 
tax non-compliance. Based on such facts, it can be said that there is a relationship between the size of the 
company and tax evasion. Therefore, the next hypothesis is stated as follows:  
 
H2d: The size of a company is negatively related to the excise duty evasion. 
 
3. The Methodology and Model  
 
    The sources of data for this study are gathered from several departments and government agencies such as 
the Royal Malaysian Customs Department (RMCD), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Malaysian 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Statistical Department of Malaysia and the Malaysian 
Automotive Association (MAA). The sample comprised of 106 completed cases that were involved in excise 
duty evasion for importation of passenger cars into Malaysia for the years 2009 to 2011. The regression model 
is estimated to examine the factors that may influence the excise duty evasion as follows:  
 
TAXEVASION =  β0 + β1TAXRATE + β2PENALTY + β3BRAND + β4SIZE + е                                           (1) 
 
      The dependent variable is the excise duty evasion (TAXEVASION) which is the amount of declared tax 
by the consignee during importation scaled by the actual taxes assessed by tax authorities.  There are four 
independent variables. The first independent variable is tax rate denoted as β1TAXRATE, the tax rate applies 
for the respective car smuggling cases. Second, the amount of penalty, denoted as β2PENALTY, and is 
measured as natural log of penalty.  Third, the brand of a car, denoted as β3BRAND, dummy variable that is 
continental car is 1 and non-continental car is 0. Fourth, the size of the company denoted as β4SIZE, measured 
as natural log of full time employees. β0 is the intercept or constant. 
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4. Findings and Analyses 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
       Table 1 below provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
model analysis. The descriptive statistics shows that the mean for TAXEVASION is 0.81, with standard 
deviation of 0.08, the minimum and maximum values for TAXEVASION are 0.63 and 0.98 respectively. The 
mean of 0.81 indicates that car importers have evaded about 81 per cent of the tax related to the smuggling of 
cars. Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics the independent variables.  Firstly, the mean of TAXRATE is 
1.30 which implies that the tax rate which applies to the smuggled car is 130 per cent. The standard deviation 
is 0.09, the minimum and maximum values are 1.15 and 1.45 respectively. Secondly, the statistic shows that 
the mean for PENALTY is 5.13, standard deviation is 0.37, while the minimum and maximum values are 4.22 
and 6.04 respectively. Thirdly, the mean for the BRAND is 0.24, which indicates that majority of the 
smuggling cases involved non continental cars. Finally, the descriptive statistics provide that the mean for 
SIZE is 25.57, standard deviation is 11.17, and the minimum and maximum of the SIZE are 10 and 42 
respectively. The statistical results indicate that the importers or consignees that were involved in the car 
smuggling activities fall under the small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables 
 N   =   106 
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
EVASION 0.81 0.08 0.63 0.98 
TAXRATE 1.30 0.09 1.15 1.45 
PENALTY 5.13 0.37 4.22 6.04 
BRAND 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 25.57 11.17 10.00 42.00 
 
4.2. Univariate Analysis 
 
      Table 2 shows the result of paired–sample t-test for declared excise duties and actual excise duties for car 
importation smuggling cases. The objective is to test whether there is a significant gap between the excise 
duties declared by the car importers and excise duties computed by the tax authorities. The paired-sample t-
test result shows that there is a significant difference between the mean of declared excise duties and actual 
excise duties at 1 per cent significance level, t-value -11.397, p-value 0.000. The result is further supported by 
the Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test. Therefore, the statistical results have supported hypothesis H1 that there is a 
significant difference between declared excise duty and actual excise duty values. The findings indicate that 
the existence of a tax gap in excise duties for the importation of cars is due to smuggling activities. 
  
Table 2. Mean Comparison between declared and actual values of Excise Duty 
Excise Duty 
Paired-sample t-Test Wilcoxon-Signed Rank 
t-statistic P-value Z-statistic P-value 
-11.397 0.000*** -8.943 0.000*** 
Note: *** Significant at 0.01 level 
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4.3. Multiple regression results 
 
     The multiple regression results in Table 3 shows that the tax evasion model is statistically significant at 1 
per cent level with the adjusted R-squared of 50.7 per cent, F-value 27.953, p- value 0.000. Thus, the multiple 
regression result indicates that 50.7 per cent of the variation in the excise duty evasion can be explained by the 
overall explanatory variables. The statistical results provide evidence of a significant and positive relationship 
between TAXRATE and TAXEVASION at 1 per cent level, coefficient-value 0.213, t-value 3.374, p-value 
0.001. Thus, the statistical result has supported hypotheses H2a that the excise duty rate is positively related to 
the excise duty evasion. The finding indicates that imported cars with higher excise duties would enhance the 
smuggling of these cars. Table 3 also shows that PENALTY is significantly and negatively associated with 
TAXEVASION at 1 per cent level (coefficient-value -0.169, t-value -7.484, p-value 0.000). Hence, the 
statistical result has supported hypothesis H2b that the rate of penalty is negatively related to the excise duty 
evasion. The finding implies that heavy penalty rate imposed by the tax authority would deter the smuggling 
of the imported cars activities.  
     However, the statistical results do not provide significant results on the relationship between BRAND and 
TAXEVASION, as well as, on the relationship between SIZE and TAXEVASION. Hence, the findings of this 
study have not supported hypothesis H2c that the brand of a car is positively related to the excise duty evasion; 
and hypothesis H2d that the size of a company is negatively related to the excise duty evasion. The finding 
implies that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the brand of a car and the size of a company 
influenced the imported car smuggling activities. 
 
Table 3. Multiple regression results 
Variable Coefficients t-statistic P-value 
Constant (β0) 1.401  9.160 .000*** 
TAXRATE (β1) .213  3.374 .001*** 
PENALTY (β2) -.169 -7.484 .000*** 
BRAND (β3) .018  1.273  .206 
SIZE (β4) .000 -.435  .665 
R² 0.525 
Adjusted R² 0.507 
F-statistic (P-value) 27.953 (0.000)*** 
Durbin Watson 1.547 
N 106 
Note: *** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
     This study examined the tax gap in the indirect taxation with particular emphasis on excise duties of 
imported vehicles. The tax gap is measured as the difference between the excise duties declared by the car 
importers and the actual values computed by the tax authorities. Furthermore, the current study has developed 
a tax evasion model to examine factors that can be associated with the smuggling of the imported vehicles. 
The determinant factors have been identified based on tax evasion literature and action research. The 
determinant factors of tax evasion in excise duties are the tax rate, amount of penalty, the brand of a car, and 
the size of a company. The sample was collected from a special audit report on the importation documents 
and customs declaration forms for the years 2009 to 2011.   
     The statistical results provide evidence on the significant difference between declared excise duties and 
actual excise duties, thus confirming the existence of the tax gap in the tax system related to importation of 
vehicles. The findings also show that the tax structure and penalty rates are the contributing factors for the tax 
evasion on vehicles smuggling activities.  Nevertheless, a car’s brand and the size of the car importers’ 
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business do not provide an explanation for the tax evasion. Hence, this study has contributed towards the body 
of literature in the discussed areas and also provides strategic information to the policymakers in reviewing 
the tax policy related to excise duties on imported vehicles in the future. 
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